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1. Introduction
Monetary policy making is complex. Central bankers examine a vast array of data,
hear from a variety of advisors, use suites of models to interpret the data, and apply
judgment to adjust the predictions of models. This process produces a monetary
policy rule that is a complicated, probably non-linear, function of a large set of
information about the state of the economy.
For both descriptive and prescriptive reasons, macroeconomists have sought a sim-
ple characterization of policy. Perhaps the most successful simpliﬁcation is due to
Taylor (1993). He ﬁnds that a very simple rule does a good job of describing Federal
Reserve interest-rate decisions, particularly since 1982. Taylor’s rule is
it = α(πt − π
∗)+γxt + εt, (1)
where i is the central bank’s policy interest rate, π is inﬂation, π∗ is the central
bank’s inﬂation target, x is output, and ε is a possibly serially correlated random
variable. With settings of α =1 .5a n dγ = .5o r1 , Taylor (1999a) uses this equation
to interpret Federal Reserve behavior over several eras since 1960.
The Taylor principle—the proposition that central banks can stabilize the macroe-
conomy by adjusting their interest rate instrument more than one-for-one with inﬂa-
tion (setting α>1)—and the Taylor rule that embodies it have proven to be powerful
devices to simplify the modeling of policy behavior. The rule appears to be a good ap-
proximation to Federal Reserve behavior since the early 1980s [Taylor (1993, 1999a),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)]. It has also been found to produce desirable out-
comes in a class of models now in heavy use in policy research [Bryant, Hooper, and
Mann (1993), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Taylor (1999b), Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004)]. Some policy institutions publish the policy interest rate paths im-
plied by Taylor-inspired simple rules, believing that these present useful benchmarks
for policy evaluation [Bank for International Settlements (1998), Sveriges Riksbank
(2001, 2002), Norges Bank (2005), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2005)]. In
large part because it is a gross simpliﬁcation of reality, the Taylor rule has been
extraordinarily useful.
Gross simpliﬁcation is both a strength and a weakness of a constant-parameter rule
like (1). Because the rule compresses and reduces information about actual policy
behavior, it can mask important aspects of that behavior. There are clearly states
of the economy in which policy settings of the nominal interest rate deviate from the
rule in substantial and serially correlated ways. This confronts researchers with a sub-
stantive modeling choice: it matters whether these deviations are shuﬄed into the ε’s
or modeled as time-varying feedback coeﬃcients, αt and γt. Positing that policy rules
mapping endogenous variables into policy choices evolve according to some probabil-
ity distribution can fundamentally change dynamics, including conditions that ensureGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 2
a unique equilibrium, and substantially expand the set of unique, stationary rational
expectations equilibria supported by conventional monetary models.
This paper generalizes Taylor’s rule and principle by allowing the parameters of
that rule to vary stochastically over time.1 It examines how such time variation aﬀects
the nature of equilibriumin popular models of monetary policy. As a ﬁrst step, in this
paper we model parameters as evolvingexogenously according to a Markov chain. The
models admit analytical solutions that make transparent how time variation in policy
parameters changes the set of equilibria conventional monetary models support. Our
modeling strategy springs from a desire to retain the simplicity of the Taylor rule and
the Taylor principle while taking a step toward realism by recognizing that actual
monetary policy behavior is complex and it does not strictly conform to a simple
constant-coeﬃcient rule.
In the Markov-switching literature, diﬀerent possible realizations of policy param-
eters are referred to as “regimes” or “states” [Hamilton (1989) or Kim and Nelson
(1999)]. Although we use these terms interchangeably with “rules,” nothing rests on
the terminology. Readers who believe the actual policy rule is time-invariant can in-
terpret this paper as pointing out that introducing a particular form of non-linearity
in policy rules can lead to important changes in the predictions of monetary models.
Our analysis starts with a simple model of inﬂation determination to illustrate the
following general points:
(1) A unique equilibrium does not require the Taylor principle to hold in every
period, but it does require that it hold for the ergodic distribution of policy.
This leads to a long-run Taylor principle, which we derive explicitly.
(2) Monetary policy can experience substantial (but brief) or modest (and pro-
longed) departures from the Taylor principle and still deliver a unique equi-
librium.
(3) If there are two possible policy rules—one that aggressively reacts to inﬂa-
tion (“more active”) and one that reacts less aggressively (“less active” or
“passive”)—the prospect that future policy might be less active can spillover
to the equilibrium under the more-active rule. The cross-regime spillover can
be substantial, making the volatility of inﬂation under the more-active rule
many times its level in a corresponding constant-parameter speciﬁcation.
1In contrast to our approach, some papers consider changes in processes governing exogenous pol-
icy variables [Dotsey (1990), Kaminsky (1993), Ruge-Murcia (1995), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003),
Davig (2003, 2004), and Leeper and Zha (2003)]. Each of these considers changes in exogenous pro-
cesses for policy instruments like a tax rate, money growth rate, or government expenditures. Two
other papers model policy switching as changes in endogenous policy functions [Davig, Leeper, and
Chung (2004) and Davig and Leeper (2005)].GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 3
These themes extend to a conventional model of inﬂation and output determination
in which price adjustment obeys Calvo’s (1983) mechanism:
(4) The long-run Taylor principle can dramatically expand the region of determi-
nacy relative to the constant-parameter setup.
(5) Cross-rule spillovers occur whenever rules diﬀer. Those spillovers can change
the responses of inﬂation and output to exogenous disturbances in quantita-
tively important ways.
Compelling empirical evidence points toward recurring regime change as a plausi-
ble working hypothesis to replace the convention of constant-coeﬃcient policy rules.
Based on that evidence, we calibrate the model to three empirically plausible policy
scenarios that illustrate the potential spillovers that can arise. First, we consider
Goodfriend’s (1993) “inﬂation scares,” in which policy is usually active but occasion-
ally becomes very active, reacting more strongly to current inﬂation. Second, drawing
on evidence from Marshall (2001) and Rabanal (2004), we examine episodes in which,
because of worries about ﬁnancial instability or slow recoveries from recessions, the
central bank reduces the weight it places on inﬂation stabilization relative to output
stabilization. The third scenario addresses a major branch of applied work, which
ﬁnds evidence of time variation in monetary policy in the United States.
2 To model
the idea that there is some probability that U.S. monetary policy can return to the
policies of the 1970s, we posit two persistent policy rules—one active and the other
passive—and show how the eﬀects of aggregate disturbances diﬀer from a constant
policy parameter setup. Each of these scenarios underscores that deviations, even
small ones, from the maintained assumption that policy parameters are ﬁxed can
drastically alter the models’ predictions of the impacts of exogenous disturbances.
Results from the three scenarios illustrate potential pitfalls in studies of monetary
policy. Many researchers insert estimated versions of (1) into dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models to study how the model economy performs [see papers
in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), Taylor (1999b) and Faust, Orphanides, and
Reifschneider (2005)]. Those researchers face a substantive choice between model-
ing deviations from the constant-coeﬃcient Taylor rule as serially correlated ε’s or
as time-varying feedback coeﬃcients.3 This modeling choice aﬀects expectations for-
mation. By assuming that parameters are ﬁxed, deviations from the rule that are
2For example, Judd and Trehan (1995), Taylor (1999a), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Kim
and Nelson (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), Rabanal (2004), Davig and Leeper (2005), Favero
and Monacelli (2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Boivin (forthcoming), and Sims and Zha (2004).
3Taylor (1993) acknowledges that the rule shuﬄes into ε much of the detail about how monetary
policy responds to the myriad exogenous disturbances that buﬀet the economy. He provides some
illustrations of circumstances in which a central bank would decide not to follow (1) rigidly. In
Taylor (1999a), he characterizes substantial and persistent departures from the rule in the early
1960s, from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, and in the early 1980s as “policy mistakes.”GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 4
nonetheless systematic responses to the economy, are ruled out. Policy is not modeled
as responding diﬀerently to inﬂation and output during business cycle expansions and
contractions, dramatic run-ups of long-term interest rates, oil-price increases, stock
market crashes, foreign ﬁnancial crises, or “jobless recoveries.” Instead, these system-
atic and predictable deviations appear as serially correlated errors that do not aﬀect
solutions or the qualitative nature of equilibrium.
This paper pursues the alternative choice—modeling deviations from a simple Tay-
lor rule as time-varying systematic responses of policy to the economy—and shows
the implications of that choice for the predictions of two standard monetary models.
2. A Model of Inflation Determination
An especially simple model of inﬂation determination emerges from using Lucas’s
(1978) asset-pricing framework to price nominal government bonds. The setup is rich
enough to highlight general features that arise in a rational expectations environ-
ment with regime change in monetary policy, but simple enough to admit analytical
solutions that make transparent the mechanisms at work.
We adopt a two-step procedure to solve the models in this paper. First, we derive
the evolution equations for endogenous variables, from which we derive analytical
conditions on the model parameters, which ensure there exists a unique equilibrium.
Next, we derive a stationary equilibrium using the method of undetermined coeﬃ-
cients to obtain solutions as functions of the minimum set of state variables. Con-
ditions from step one are employed to guarantee the solution in step two is unique.
Throughout the paper, ﬁscal policy is in the background, passively adjusting lump-
sum taxes and transfers to ensure ﬁscal solvency.
2.1. The Setup. Consider a nominal bond that costs $1 at date t and pays oﬀ
$(1 + it)a td a t et +1 . The asset-pricing equation for this bond can be written in
log-linearized form as:
it = Etπt+1 + Etrt+1, (2)
where Etrt+1, the expected real interest rate, is the conditional expectation at t of
the stochastic discount factor. For simplicity, the real interest rate is exogenous and
evolves according to
rt = ρrt−1 + υt, (3)
with |ρ| < 1a n dυ is an i.i.d. random variable.
Monetary policy follows a simpliﬁed Taylor rule, adjusting the nominal interest rate
in response to inﬂation, where the reaction to inﬂation evolves stochastically betweenGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 5
regimes:4
it = α(st)πt. (4)
st is the observed policy regime, which takes realized values of 1 or 2. Two regimes
are suﬃcient for our purposes, though the methods employed immediately generalize
to many regimes. Regime follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities pij =
P[st = j |st−1 = i], where i,j =1 ,2. We assume
α(st)=
 
α1 for st =1
α2 for st =2 .
We assume the processes for s and υ are independent.
A monetary policy regime is a distinct realization of the random variable α(st)a n d
a monetary policy process consists of all possible αi’s and the transition probabilities
of the Markov chain, (α1,α 2,p 11,p 22). In this model, monetary policy is active in
regime i if αi > 1a n dpassive if αi < 1, following the terminology of Leeper (1991).
If α1 >α 2, then the monetary policy process becomes more active if α1,α 2, or p11
increase or p22 decreases.
Substituting (4) into (2) and using (3), the system reduces to the single state-
dependent equation:
α(st)πt = Etπt+1 + ρrt. (5)
Realizations of the real interest rate at t can aﬀect current inﬂation only if they are
informative about the future path of r; that is, only if ρ  =0 . The serial correlation of
r, therefore, plays the role of a propagation mechanism in this model, which otherwise
contains no source of propagation.
If only a single, ﬁxed regime were possible, then αi = α and the expected path
of policy depends on the constant α. A unique equilibrium requires active policy





Stronger responses of policy to inﬂation (larger values of α) reduce the variability of
inﬂation. The Taylor principle says that α>1 is necessary and suﬃcient for a unique
equilibrium.
When α<1 and regime is ﬁxed, the equilibrium is not unique and self-fulﬁlling
sunspot equilibria are possible. In this case, the diﬀerence equation for inﬂation is
stable and the “forward solution” is non-stationary. Stationary solutions for inﬂation
make πt a function of (πt−1,r t) and possibly a sunspot shock.
4Although this rule is clearly sub-optimal in this model, its use is motivated by the fact that it
produces eﬀects that carry over to a richer model, like the one in section 3, in which Taylor rules
are nearly optimal.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 6
2.2. The Long-Run Taylor Principle. With regime change, the diﬀerence equa-
tion in (5) can be expressed as a system, with an equation for each possible date t
regime. Let Ω
−s
t = {rt,r t−1,...,s t−1,s t−2,...} denote the representative agent’s in-
formation set at t, not including the current regime, and let Ωt =Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}.A l l
expectations are formed conditional on Ωt.
In general, the expectation of inﬂation in (5) is given by
E[πt+1(st+1 = i,st = j)|Ωt],
for i,j =1 ,2. Integrating out the current regime, st, and writing (5) for st =1a n d
st =2 ,





















These equations are derived assuming that current regime enters the agent’s informa-
tion set. This assumption contrasts with the usual econometric treatment of regime
as an unobserved state variable [Hamilton (1989) or Kim and Nelson (1999)]. Future
regimes, however, are not known.
5
Appendix A shows how to convert these equations into a system in realized state-
dependent inﬂation rates, whose dynamics are governed by the eigenvalues of
 
p11 1 − p11
1 − p22 p22







p11α2 + p22α1 ±
 
(p11α2 + p22α1)2 +4 α1α2(1 − p11 − p22)
2(p11 + p22 − 1)
,k =1 ,2. (8)
A unique equilibrium requires that the absolute values of both roots exceed unity,
leading to a generalization of the Taylor principle. A monetary policy process satisﬁes
the long-run Taylor principle if and only if
λk > 1f o rk =1 ,2.
Two unstable eigenvalues imply two linear restrictions that uniquely determine the
regime-dependent expectations of inﬂation in (6) and (7). This is quite diﬀerent from
5Some theoretical work treats agents as havingto infer the current regime [Andolfattoand Gomme
(2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), and Davig (2004)]. Concentrating all uncertainty about policy
on future regimes, as we do, makes clearer how expectations formation, as opposed to inference
problems, aﬀect the regime-switching equilibrium.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 7
ﬁxed regimes because now it is possible for both roots to be unstable, even if αi < 1i n
one regime. With regime switching, when there is a unique equilibrium, the solutions
always come from “solving forward,” even in regimes where monetary policy behavior
is passive (αi < 1). This delivers solutions that are qualitatively diﬀerent from those
obtained with ﬁxed regimes. The roots are highly non-linear functions of all the
parameters of the monetary policy process, including the feedback coeﬃcients in the
rule and the transition probabilities for regimes.
A necessary condition for uniqueness is that policy be active in at least one regime,
so αi > 1f o rs o m ei. When this necessary condition is satisﬁed, the long-run Taylor
principle simpliﬁes to:
p11(1 − α2)+p22(1 − α1)+α1α2 > 1. (9)
This determinacy condition implies that a range of monetary policy behavior is con-
sistent with a unique equilibrium: monetary policy can be mildly passive most of the
time or very passive some of the time. To see this, suppose that regime 1 is active and
regime 2 is passive and consider the limiting case that arises as α1 becomes arbitrarily
large. Driving α1 →∞in (9) implies that α2 >p 22 is the lower bound for α2 in a
determinate equilibrium. For α1 suﬃciently large, a unique equilibrium can have α2
arbitrarily close to 0 (a pegged nominal interest rate), so long as the regime in which
this passive policy is realized is suﬃciently short-lived (p22 → 0). When regime 1 is
an absorbing state (p11 =1 ) , the eigenvalues are α1 and α2/p22. A unique equilibrium
requires that that α1 > 1a n dα2 >p 22.
6 The general principle is that an active
regime that is either very aggressive (α1 →∞ ) or very persistent (p11 =1 )i m p o s e s
the weakest condition on behavior in the passive regime.
Alternatively, the passive regime can be extremely persistent (p22 → 1), so long as
α2 is suﬃciently close to, but still less than, 1. In this case, if the active regime has
short duration, it is possible for the ergodic probability of the passive regime to be
close to 1 (but less than 1), yet still deliver a unique equilibrium.
An interesting special case arises when both regimes are reﬂecting states. With
p11 = p22 =0 , the eigenvalues reduce to λk = ±
√
α1α2. When the α’s are both
positive and regime 1 is active, the lower bound on the passive policy (α2)f o ra
unique equilibrium is α2 > 1/α1. In this case, the economy spends equal amounts of
time in the two regimes, but it changes regime every period with probability 1. This
inequality reinforces the general principle that the more aggressive monetary policy
is in active regimes, the more passive it can be in other regimes and still deliver
uniqueness.
6As the system derived in appendix A makes clear, p11 = 1 makes the system recursive, so the
diﬀerence equation for inﬂation in state 1 is independent of state 2 and yields the usual ﬁxed-regime
solution for inﬂation. The second equation reduces to a diﬀerence equation in inﬂation in state 2
and a unique, stationary solution to that equation requires α2 >p 22.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 8
Figure 1 uses the eigenvalues in (8) to plot combinations of the policy-rule coef-
ﬁcients, α1 and α2, that deliver unique equilibria for given transition probabilities.
Light-shaded areas mark regions of the parameter space that deliver unique equilib-
ria when regime is ﬁxed. When regime can change, those regions expand to include
the dark-shaded areas. The top two panels show that as the mean duration, given
by 1/(1 − pii), of each regime declines, the determinacy region expands. Asymmet-
ric mean duration expands the determinacy region in favor of the parameter drawn
from the more transient regime (α2 in the southwest panel of the ﬁgure). As the
mean durations of both regimes approach 1 period, the determinacy region expands
dramatically along both the α1 and α2 dimensions, as the southeast panel shows.
2.3. Solutions. To solve the model, deﬁne the state of the economy at time t to be
(rt,s t). We are interested only in unique, stationary equilibria. We ﬁnd the model’s






a1 for st =1
a2 for st =2 .
Within the class of solutions that are functions of (rt,s t), the MSV solution is unique.
Of course, there may be other solutions that are functions of an expanded state
vector, so the question of whether the MSV solution is the only solution remains to
be answered. We use (8) to check that all the solutions we report are unique.
Expected inﬂation one step ahead depends on this period’s realizations of regime
and real interest rate, as well as on next period’s expected solution:
Etπt+1 = E[πt+1|st,r t]
= ρrtE[a(st+1)|st,r t], (10)
where we have used the independence of the processes governing r and s.T h ep o s i t e d
solutions, together with (10), imply the following regime-dependent expectations:
E[πt+1 |st =1 ,r t]=[ p11a1 +( 1− p11)a2]ρrt, (11)
E[πt+1 |st =2 ,r t]=[ ( 1− p22)a1 + p22a2]ρrt. (12)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (5) for each st =1 ,2, we obtain a linear system in










α1 − ρp11 −ρ(1 − p11)
































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c t st h a tp12 =1−p11 and p21 =1−p22, and we have deﬁned







The limiting arguments applied to (9), together with the stationarity of the real
interest rate process, imply that in a unique equilibrium, αi >ρ p ii, so aF
i ≥ 0.a F
i
is strictly increasing in ρ (for αi > 0), strictly decreasing in αi (for ρ>0), and
strictly increasing in pii (for ρ>0). It is straightforward to show that the volatility
of inﬂation is smaller in the regime where policy is more active; that is, a1 <a 2 if
α1 >α 2.
Notice that if α2 < 1, nothing like solution (14) can emerge from a ﬁxed-regime
setup. In a ﬁxed-regime model, α<1 creates a stable root which, following Sargent’s
(1987) dictum to “solve unstable roots forward and stable roots backward,” makes
a stationary solution for πt depend on πt−1 (and shocks). With recurring regime
change, in contrast, the “forward solution” is stationary even when α2 < 1. This has
the eﬀect of expanding the set of unique, stationary rational expectations equilibria
relative to those available under ﬁxed regimes.
In general, all policy parameters enter the solution. Policy behavior in regime 2
aﬀects the equilibrium in regime 1 and vice versa. Let D =1− p12aF
2 p21aF
1 denote
the denominator common to (13) and (14). D ∈ (0,1] and reaches its upper bound
whenever regimes are absorbing states (p12 =0o rp21 =0 ) . Values of D less than
1 scale up the coeﬃcients relative to their “ﬁxed-regime” counterparts. D achieves
its minimum when regimes are reﬂecting states (p12 = p21 =1 ) . In that case, D =
1−ρ2/α1α2, raising the variability of inﬂation by its maximum amount (given values
for α1 and α2).
The numerators in the solutions report the two distinct eﬀects that news about
future real interest rates has on current inﬂation. Suppose the economy is in regime
1 and a higher real interest rate is realized. One eﬀect is direct and raises inﬂation
by an amount inversely related to α1, just as it would if regime were ﬁxed. A second
eﬀect works through expected inﬂation, E[πt+1|st =1 ,r t], which is the function given
by (11), (p11a1 + p12a2)ρrt. The term p12aF
2 in (13) arises from the expectation that
7When regime is ﬁxed at i, pii =1 ,p jj =0 ,i  = j,i,j =1 ,2 and the coeﬃcients reduce to
aF
i = ρ/(αi − ρ).GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 10
regime can change, with p12 the probability of changing from regime 1 to regime 2.
The size of this eﬀect is also inversely related α1 through the coeﬃcient aF
1 . Both
of these eﬀects are tempered when the current policy regime is active (α1 > 1) or
ampliﬁed when current policy is passive (α1 < 1).
The a1 and a2 coeﬃcients have the intuitive properties that they are strictly de-
creasing in both α1 and α2 and strictly increasing in ρ. More active monetary policy
raises the α’s and decreases the inﬂation impacts of real interest rate shocks. Greater
persistence in real interest rates ampliﬁes the magnitude and therefore the impact
of real-rate shocks on inﬂation. If α1 >α 2, then as p11 rises (holding p22 ﬁxed), the
persistence of the more-active regime and the fraction of time the economy spends in
the more-active regime both rise. This reduces the reaction of inﬂation to real-rate
disturbances in both regimes.8
How strongly regime 2 behavior aﬀects the equilibrium in regime 1 depends on the
probability of transitioning from regime 1 to regime 2, p12, and on the policy behavior
in and the persistence of regime 2, which are determined by α2 and p22. Cross-regime
spillovers to regime 1 can be large if p12 is large, p22 is large, or α2 is small. The
only way to eliminate spillover is for regime 1 to be an absorbing state. In that case,
p11 = 1 and the solution in that regime is πt =[ ρ/(α1−ρ)]rt, exactly the ﬁxed-regime
rule.
2.4. Implications of Regime Switching. Solutions (13) and (14) suggest the po-
tential for spillovers from regime 2 to regime 1 and to the ergodic distribution of
inﬂation. We now show that in this setup those spillovers can be quantitatively im-
portant. We restrict attention to regions of the policy parameter space for which a
unique equilibrium exists.
Results in this section focus on how regime change alters the variability of inﬂation
relative to a ﬁxed-regime policy that always satisﬁes the Taylor principle. Throughout
these examples, we assume that policy is more active in regime 1 than in regime 2
(α1 >α 2) and that policy may be passive in regime 2 (α2 < 1). We show how in the
switching setup the standard deviation of inﬂation conditional on regime 1 compares
to its ﬁxed-regime counterpart. For most of the results, we assume that in the active
regime, whether ﬁxed or switching, policy reacts to inﬂation with a coeﬃcient of 1.5,
as in Taylor’s (1993) original formulation. If policy is less active (or passive) in regime
2, inﬂation can be appreciably more volatile even in the active regime, compared to
ﬁxed-regime policy.
2.4.1. Mildly Passive Most of the Time. Figure 2 illustrates the implications for in-
ﬂation volatility of a policy process that is slightly passive most of the time, yet
the equilibrium is unique. Active policy is transitory, lasting only one period before
8Of course, if α1 >α 2 and p22 rises (holding p11 ﬁxed), then both a1 and a2 rise.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 11
switching back to passive behavior (p11 =0 ) . The top panel indicates the ergodic
probability of the active regime that is associated with each plot of relative standard
deviations as a function of regime 2 policy (α2). For a given α2, the smaller the ergodic
probability of the active regime, the more volatile inﬂation is in both regimes. In this
example, that ergodic probability is given by (1 − p22)/(2 − p22), so it is completely
determined by the persistence of regime 2. Here the distinction between inﬂation
behavior in the two regimes is not very pronounced because the high probability of
transitioning from regime 1 to 2 maximizes the spillovers. These spillovers are sub-
stantial, with inﬂation more than ﬁve times more volatile in the active regime than
in its ﬁxed-regime counterpart.
This example creates diﬃculties for empirical eﬀorts to infer whether observed time
series were generated by a determinate or an indeterminate equilibrium [Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)]. Samples of the lengths
typically employed—20 to 40 years—can with high probability never realize active
monetary policy or realize very few observations of active policy. Parameter estimates
based on such samples will inevitably conclude that policy was passive throughout
and that the equilibrium is indeterminate.
2.4.2. Spectacular Spillovers from Extremely Passive Policy. A purely transitory pas-
sive regime can generate spectacular spillovers to the active regime. When p22 =0 ,
the lower bound for uniqueness on policy in the passive regime is given by α2 >
(1 − p11)/(α1 − p11). This bound falls as active policy becomes more aggressive (α1
rises) or more persistent (p11 → 1). In both cases the lower bound on α2 approaches
p22 =0 , representing a pegged nominal interest rate of the form the Federal Reserve
adopted during World War II until the Treasury Accord in 1953.
Table 1 reports the same relative standard deviations of inﬂation shown in the
ﬁgures, but for select values of p11 and α2. Scanning down the column titled “Regime
1,” the numbers outside the parentheses give the standard deviation in regime 1 with
α1 =1 .5 relative to a ﬁxed regime with α =1 .5. When the probability of passing from
the active to the passive regime is .01 (p11 = .99), the relative standard deviation rises
from 1.3 to 7.5 as α2 falls from .10 to .02. Even when the probability of switching
to passive policy is .001, over this range of α2’s the relative standard deviation of
inﬂation varies from 2 percent higher to 14 percent higher than in the ﬁxed regime.
Monetary policy in the active regime can oﬀset the spillovers from the passive
regime by leaning more strongly against the wind. Numbers in parentheses reﬂect
the standard deviations of inﬂation when the active regime sets α1 = 2 relative to
a ﬁxed regime with α =1 .5. Of course, more aggressive active behavior lowers the
determinacy bound for α2. Setting α1 = 2 allows α2 to move closer to zero, drastically
raising the volatility in regime 2 and spilling over strongly to regime 1.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 12
This spectacular example resembles a peso problem. A small probability (.001) of
extremelypassive policy behavior (α2 = .001) can cause substantially higher volatility
in the active regime. Moreover, time series generated by this policy process are quite
likely never to exhibit the passive policy, making it problematic to identify the source
of the volatility.
3. A Model of Inflation and Output Determination
This section and the next report the implications of a regime-switching monetary
policy process for determinacy and equilibrium dynamics in a bare-bones model from
the class of models with nominal rigidities now in wide use for monetary policy anal-
ysis. Ours is a textbook version, as in Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003), but the
general insights extend to the variants being ﬁt to data [Smets and Wouters (2003)
and Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2004)]. There are several reasons to exam-
ine regime change in a more complex model: it brings the analysis closer to models
now being used to confront data, compute optimal policy, and conduct actual policy
analysis at central banks; the model contains an explicit transmission mechanism for
monetary policy—an endogenous real interest rate—which tempers some of the spec-
tacular spillovers found in the simple model; it allows us to track how the possibility
of regime change inﬂuences the dynamic impacts of aggregate demand and aggregate
supply shocks on inﬂation and output.
3.1. The Model. The linearized equations describing private sector behavior are the
consumption-Euler equation and aggregate supply relations




πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + u
S
t , (16)
where xt is the output gap, uD
t is an aggregate demand shock, and uS
t is an aggre-
gate supply shock. σ−1 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, κ is a
function of how frequently price adjustments occur, as in Calvo (1983), and of β, the
discount factor. The slope of the supply curve is determined by κ =( 1 −ω)(1−βω)/ω,
where 1 − ω is the randomly selected fraction of ﬁrms that adjust prices. Prices are
more ﬂexible as ω → 0, which makes κ →∞ . Most of our examples use a benchmark
calibration of β = .99,σ=1 ,ρ= .9,ω=2 /3, so κ = .18. We interpret a model period
as one quarter in calendar time.
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s] = 0 for all t
and s.I f s h o c k sa r ei.i.d., then regime switching is irrelevant to the dynamics, but
not the determinacy properties of the equilibrium.
As before, monetary policy is the source of regime switching and we assume a
simpliﬁed Taylor rule that sets the nominal interest rate according to
it = α(st)πt + γ(st)xt, (17)
where st evolves according to a Markov chain with transition matrix Π, with typical
element pij =P r [ st = j|st−1 = i]f o ri,j =1 ,2. st is independent of uD
t and uS
t . As
before, α(st)e q u a l sα1 or α2 and γ(st)e q u a l sγ1 or γ2. We assume the steady state
does not change across regimes.
3.2. Fixed-Regime Equilibrium. Intuition from the ﬁxed-regime equilibrium car-



















where ΔZ =1+σ−1(ακ + γ) − ρZ[1 + σ−1(κ + βγ)+β(1− ρZ)],Z= S,D.
More-active monetary policy (higher α) reduces the elasticities of inﬂation and
output to demand shocks. Supply shocks, however, present the monetary authority
with a well-known tradeoﬀ: a more-active policy stance reduces the elasticity of
inﬂation with respect to supply shocks, but it raises the responsiveness of output. A
stronger reaction of monetary policy to output (higher γ) reduces the elasticities of
inﬂation and output to demand shocks. Higher γ reduces the elasticity of output to
supply shocks and raises the responsiveness of inﬂation to supply shocks.
3.3. The Long-Run Taylor Principle. Turning back to the setup with regime
change, this section describes how to derive restrictions on the monetary policy pro-
cess that ensure the long-run Taylor principle is satisﬁed. Substituting the policy
rule, (17), into (15) yields
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(α(st)πt + γ(st)xt − Etπt+1)+u
D
t . (18)
The system to be solved consists of (16) and (18).
To specify the system whose eigenvalues determine whether there exists a unique
equilibrium, we follow the procedure in section 2.2. Let πit = πt(st = i)a n d
xit = xt(st = i),i=1 ,2, denote state-speciﬁc inﬂation and output. As appendixGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 14
B describes, after deﬁning the forecast errors
η
π
1t+1 = π1t+1 − Etπ1t+1,η
π
2t+1 = π2t+1 − Etπ2t+1,
η
x
1t+1 = x1t+1 − Etx1t+1,η
x
2t+1 = x2t+1 − Etx2t+1,
the model is cast in the form






































and the matrices are deﬁned in the appendix. A unique equilibrium requires four un-
stable roots to generate four linear restrictions that determine the regime-dependent
forecast errors for inﬂation and output. The eigenvalues of this system determine
whether the monetary policy process satisﬁes the long-run Taylor principle.
Analytical expressions for the eigenvalues are available, but do not yield compact
expressions for the restrictions that guarantee a unique equilibrium. We nonetheless
use those analytical expressions to calculate the eigenvalues to check whether a given
monetary policy process satisﬁes the long-run Taylor principle.9 Figure 3 illustrates
that recurring regime change can dramatically expand the set of policy parameters
that deliver a unique equilibrium.
10 As long as one regime is active, the less persistent
the other regime is, the smaller is the lower bound on the response of monetary policy
to inﬂation. The bottom panels of the ﬁgure indicate that when regimesare transitory,
a large negative response of policy to inﬂation is consistent with determinacy. As in
the simple model, a unique equilibrium can be produced by a policy process that is
mildly passive most of the time or very passive some of the time.
In contrast to ﬁxed regimes, recurring regime change makes determinacy of equilib-
rium depend on the policy process and all the parameters describing private behavior,
(β,σ,κ), even when the Taylor rule does not respond to output. Because the cur-
rent regime is not expected to prevail forever, parameters that aﬀect intertemporal
margins interact with expected policies to inﬂuence determinacy [ﬁgure 4]. Greater
willingness of households to substitute intertemporally (lower σ) or greater ability of
ﬁrms to adjust prices (lower ω) enhance substitution away from expected inﬂation,
which gives expected regime change a smaller role in decisions. This shrinks the
determinacy region toward the ﬂexible-price region in section 2.
9We also compute the generalized eigenvalues for system (19) and check the spanning criteria
used by Sims’s (2001) gensys program to conﬁrm existence and uniqueness of a solution.
10For simplicity, ﬁgures 3 and 4 are drawn setting γ(st)=0 ,s t =1 ,2, so in ﬁxed regimes, the
Taylor principle is α1 > 1a n dα2 > 1.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 15







The method of undetermined coeﬃcients delivers solutions as functions of this small-




















1 for st =1
aZ




1 for st =1
bZ
2 for st =2 ,Z = D,S.
These posited solutions, along with their one-step-ahead expectations,


















































for i,j =1 ,2, are substituted into (16) and (18) to form a system whose solution
yields expressions for π and x as functions of the model parameters and the monetary
policy process. Appendix B describes the systems of equations that are solved.
4. Three Empirically Plausible Policy Processes
We turn now to study the implications of three monetary policy processes that
empirical evidence suggests are relevant. The ﬁrst process pursues the idea that
modeling recurring regime change can be important even if the policy process is
switching between two active regimes. There is evidence that over the past decade
or so, U.S. monetary policy has ﬂuctuated between aggressive and less-aggressive
stances against inﬂation. We illustrate this idea by interpreting Goodfriend’s (1993)
“inﬂation scares” episodes.
The second process examinesinstances when central banks abandon their “business-
as-usual” rule and do something diﬀerent. Examples include the October 1987 stock
market crash, Asian and Russian ﬁnancial crises in the 1990s, credit controls in 1980,
sluggish job-market recoveries from recessions, and currency crises. These are events
with small probability mass that recur and can entail a substantial deviation from
the usual rule. We model these events as relatively short-lived excursions into passive
policy behavior, though we recognize that this is, at best, a crude representation of
the diversity of examples listed above.
The ﬁnal process addresses the consequences of private agents believing there is a
small probability of returning to a persistent regime like the one that prevailed in the
1970s. This process reﬂects empirical work that ﬁnds U.S. monetary policy followed
very diﬀerent rules from 1960 to 1979 and after 1982 and it captures some of the drive
in favor of inﬂation targeting.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 16
4.1. Inﬂation Scares. Goodfriend (1993) coined the term “inﬂation scares” to de-
scribe instances when long-term interest rates rise, even when contemporaneous mea-
sures of inﬂation are not rising. For example, Fed tightening during the 1983-1984
inﬂation scare increased the real short-term rate by 3 percentage points, even though
inﬂation was steady at 4 percent. Goodfriend (2005) argues that inﬂation scares occur
at times when the Federal Reserve’s commitment to act aggressively against inﬂation
is in question. Scares have recurred over the past 25 years—Chairman Paul Volcker
faced four and Chairman Alan Greenspan two. Inﬂation scares are also prone to oc-
cur during transitions between Fed chairs—the 1987 scare coincided with Greenspan’s
appointment.
Constant-parameter Taylor rules, which do not include long rates as arguments,
categorize a sharp rise in the interest rate instrument as a “shock”—the unsystematic
part of policy behavior. But Goodfriend argues that Fed behavior during inﬂation
scares is systematic and speciﬁcally designed to aﬀect agents’ beliefs about the Fed’s
commitment to ﬁght inﬂation. During a scare, the Fed systematically responds more
strongly to inﬂation than in normal times. One way to model this, which maintains
the simplicity of a Taylor-rule speciﬁcation, is to treat policy as moderately active
most of the time, responding to inﬂation with a coeﬃcient of 1.5, but occasionally—
and only brieﬂy—very active, raising the interest rate by 2.5 times the change in
inﬂation.11
Consider a monetary policy process with α1 =2 .5, α2 =1 .5, p11 = .5, and p22 =
.975.12 Policy is moderately active 95 percent of the time and very active the rest of
the time; the expected duration of the more-active regime is 2 quarters.
In the inﬂation-scare state, a demand shock can raise inﬂation and lower output on
impact, just as an aggregate supply shock usually does. Figure 5 plots the expected
paths in the very active regime and in a ﬁxed regime.
13 More aggressive policy
tempers the impact of the shock on current and expected inﬂation by sharply raising
the real interest rate. Lower inﬂation is achieved, however, through lower output. In
the assumed policy process, the real rate rises enough to more than oﬀset the positive
output eﬀects of the demand shock, and output can fall on impact.
14 In subsequent
periods, the real interest rate essentially follows the path it would if regime were ﬁxed,
so output exhibits a hump-shaped response, as it does in many empirical studies that
11This policy process might also describe the Fed’s preemptive strike against inﬂation in 1994,
which Leeper and Zha (2003) model as an intervention on policy shocks.
12We set γ1 = γ2 =0 .
13Expected paths are computed from 50,000 simulated paths in which regime is randomly drawn
for periods t ≥ 2; the demand shock is 1 at t =1a n d0f o rt ≥ 2, and the supply shock is 0 for t ≥ 1.
14Lower values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, such as .16 as in Woodford (2003),
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identify aggregate demand shocks [Blanchard and Quah (1989), Leeper, Sims, and
Zha (1996)].
4.2. Financial Crises and Business Cycles. Periodically, monetary policy shifts
its focus from price stability to other concerns. Two other concerns that recurrently
come into the central bank’s focus are ﬁnancial stability and job creation. Episodes
in which price stability is de-emphasized in favor of other objectives can last a few
months or more than a year. Distinctive features of these episodes are that they
recur fairly often and they represent an important shift away from monetary policy’s
usual reaction to inﬂation and output. In the United States, since Greenspan became
chairman of the Fed in the summer of 1987, the episodes include at least two stock
market crashes, two foreign ﬁnancial crises, and two “jobless recoveries”—an episode
every three years, on average.
15
Marshall (2001) carefully documents the ﬁnancial crisis in late summer and fall
of 1998. In August the Russian government devalued the rouble, defaulted on debt,
and suspended payments by ﬁnancial institutions to foreign creditors. These actions
precipitated the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a large hedge fund.
The Fed reacted swiftly by cutting the federal funds rate by a total of 75 basis
points over three moves. One of the policy moves arose from an unusual intermeeting
conference call on October 15 and all the moves occurred against a backdrop of
concern by Federal Open Market Committee members about inﬂation. In fact, until
the August 18 FOMC meeting, which left the funds rate unchanged, the Committee
concluded the risks to the outlook were tilted toward rising inﬂation. Marshall argues
that the Fed’s unusually rapid response signalled that the “policy rule had changed,”
with the purpose of discretely shifting private-sector beliefs to a lower likelihood of a
liquidity crisis in the United States.
Rabanal (2004) presents a variety of evidence on time variation in Taylor rules.
First, he reports estimates of Taylor rules with parameter drift that buttress Mar-
shall’s claim: during periods that Rabanal calls “high risk in the economy,” the Fed’s
response to inﬂation declines appreciably. High-risk periods include ﬁnancial crises.
Rabanal also estimates a two-state—recessions and expansions—Taylor rule to ﬁnd
that during recessions the Fed’s reaction to inﬂation is weaker and its reaction to out-
put is stronger than during expansions. Davig and Leeper’s (2005) estimates of (17)
identify the “jobless recoveries” from the recessions of 1990-91 and 2000 as episodes
of passive Fed behavior, with a weaker response to inﬂation and a stronger response
to output than in the surrounding active episodes. Whereas Rabanal estimates the
15We do not include the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in this list because, although the
Fed reacted sharply by pumping liquidity into the market and lowering the federal funds rate, within
two months it had just as sharply withdrawn the liquidity. This event is probably best modeled as
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economy is three times more likely to be in an expansion than a recession, Davig
and Leeper, using data beginning in the late 1940s, estimate that active and passive
regimes are almost equally likely.
Table 2 reports that spillovers from a passive regime can substantially raise the
standard deviations of inﬂation and output in an active regime relative to their values
in a ﬁxed regime. The probabilities of transitioning to the passive regime are 5 percent
and 2.5 percent (p11 = .95 and p11 = .975), which correspond to a ﬁnancial crisis or
stronger concern about job growth occurring every 5 or 10 years, on average. In the
active and the ﬁxed regimes, α1 = α =1 .5a n dγ1 = .25. Passive policy responds
more strongly to output (γ2 = .5), while both its response to inﬂation, α2, and its
persistence, p22, take diﬀerent values in the table.16
When the passive regime always lasts only one period (p22 =0 ) , spillovers are
relatively small and intuition from ﬁxed regimes directly applies: when regime 2 is
more passive (lower α2), spillovers raise the volatility of inﬂation and output from
demand shocks, raise the volatility of inﬂation from supply shocks, and lower the
volatility of output from supply shocks. Fixed-regime intuition carries over because
when the passive regime lasts only one period, it has only a minor impact on expected
inﬂation.
As the passive regime becomes more persistent (p22 rises), the monetary policy
process becomes less active and the relative volatility of inﬂation rises monotonically
across both types of shocks. Even when the expected duration of passive policy is
only 2 quarters (p22 = .5), as it might be during some ﬁnancial crises, if policy is
very passive, inﬂation volatility can be 20 percent or more higher in the active state
than in a ﬁxed-regime setup. When the duration is one year (p22 = .75), as when
the Fed kept interest rates low for extended periods during the two recent recoveries
from recession, inﬂation can be 50 percent more volatile than in a ﬁxed regime [see
columns for p11 = .95].
Persistence in the passive regime changes the eﬀects of increases in the degree
to which policy is passive on relative output variability. The prospect of moving to
a passive regime raises current and expected inﬂation in the active regime relative
to a ﬁxed regime. Although it starts at a higher level, in the long run the ergodic
mean of inﬂation in the switching environment converges to the mean when regime is
constant. With inﬂation expected to fall more rapidly in the active regime, the real
interest rate rises more sharply. A higher real rate oﬀsets the eﬀects of a demand
shock on output, but it reinforces the impacts of a supply shock. This shows up
in table 2 as declining relative output variability in the demand columns and rising
16In the case of pure inﬂation targeting, γ1 = γ2 = γ =0 , the relative standard deviations in the
table are ampliﬁed, but the patterns are identical to those in the table.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 19
relative output variability in the supply columns, as the monetary policy process
becomes more passive.
4.3. A Return to the 1970s? Many observers of U.S. monetary policy fear that
the Fed could revert to the policies of the 1970s. Such a fear is often behind argu-
ments for adopting inﬂation targeting in the United States [Bernanke and Mishkin
(1997), Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999a), Mishkin (2004), Goodfriend
(2005)]. The United States seems particularly susceptible to this kind of policy rever-
sal because, in the absence of institutional reforms, the Fed relies on what Bernanke,
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999b) call the “just trust us” approach, which relies
more on the personal credibility of policy makers than on the credibility of the policy
institution or the policymaking process.17
Three widely cited empirical studies report constant-coeﬃcient estimates of Tay-
lor rules for the United States [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Taylor (1999a),
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003)]. Each of these reports that U.S. monetary policy
was passive through the 1960s and 1970s and active since 1982. Eﬀorts to estimate
Markov-switching versions of these rules frequently ﬁnd analogous results [Favero and
Monacelli (2003), Davig and Leeper (2005)].18 A literal interpretation of the switching
results is that agents place substantial probability mass on a return to the inﬂationary
times of the 1970s.
4.3.1. Determinacy Regions for Previous Studies. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) em-
phasize that in a model with a ﬁxed policy rule, their estimate of Fed behavior
from 1960-1979 leaves the model undetermined and subject to self-fulﬁlling sunspot
equilibria.19 Since the early 1980s, however, Lubik and Schorfheide infer their esti-
mates imply a unique equilibrium. For the latter period, they estimate α1 =2 .19
and γ1 = .17, while for the earlier period the estimates are α2 = .77 and γ2 = .3.
Their maximum likelihood estimates contrast the ﬁt of determinate to indeterminate
equilibria under the maintained assumption that policy rules cannot change.
17Fiscal policy represents a possible impetus for a change from an active to a passive monetary
policy stance. In 2005, in the face of growing federal government budget deﬁcits, the talk in Wash-
ington is of making President Bush’s earlier tax cuts permanent, not of how spending and taxes can
be adjusted to balance the budget. Demographic shifts in the United States and elsewhere have
created projected ﬁscal deﬁcits for the foreseeable future [Kotlikoﬀ and Burns (2004)]. As ﬁscal
pressures build, it may be reasonable to expect some erosion of the much-vaunted independence of
the Federal Reserve. A possible outcome is a shift to a policy that accommodates inﬂation as a
source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing. Sargent’s (1999) learning environment oﬀers a diﬀerent rationale for how a
return to the 1970s might arise. In his setup, time inconsistency and constant-gain learning combine
to create incentives for policy to optimally choose to revert to an accommodative stance.
18Sims and Zha (2004), in contrast, ﬁnd that the best ﬁt is achieved from an identiﬁed VAR with
constant coeﬃcients and eight distinct variance states.
19Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) also suggest this possibility.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 20
Figure 6 reports combinations of the transition probabilities, (p11,p 22), that yield a
unique equilibrium given the Lubik-Schorfheide estimates of policy parameters (light-
shaded plus dark-shaded regions). For reference, the ﬁgure also reports determinacy
regions for Taylor’s (1999a) estimates—α1 =1 .5,γ 1 = .75 (post-1987) and α2 =
.8,γ 2 = .25 (1960-1979). A larger set of transition probabilities is consistent with
determinacy under the Lubik-Schorfheide estimates because their active regime is
substantially more active than is Taylor’s (2.19 compared to 1.5).
On the surface, the ﬁgure seems to support Lubik and Schorfheide’sinference. After
all, if the passive regime has an expected duration of more than 5 years (p22 >. 95), as
switching estimates consistently ﬁnd, then Lubik and Schorfheide’s policy parameter
estimates imply indeterminacy. Carrying this argument forward, however, reveals an
unappealing implication. Unless one is willing to maintain the extreme assumption
that the post-1982 regime is an absorbing state (p11 =1 ) , the U.S. economy must
still be in an indeterminate equilibrium.20 Without assuming people place no proba-
bility mass on future passive policy, it is diﬃcult to reconcile Lubik and Schorfheide’s
conclusions with an environment of recurring regime change.
4.3.2. Impacts of Demand and Supply Shocks. To illustrate the potential spillovers of
a belief that policy might return to its passive behavior in the 1970s, we impose Lubik
and Schorfheide’s policy parameter estimates, along with the transition probabilities
p11 = .95 and p22 = .93, on the model of inﬂation and output determination. These
probabilities mean there is a 5 percent chance of returning to a passive policy rule.
The active regime is expected to last 20 quarters, while the passive regime lasts
14 quarters, on average. We gauge the extent of spillovers to the active regime by
contrasting responses of inﬂation and output to demand and supply disturbances in
the active regime to those in an equivalently active ﬁxed regime.
Cross-regime spilloversfrom this policy process are substantial. Figure 7 shows that
researchers predicting the impacts of exogenous disturbances assuming the policy
rule is ﬁxed will consistently underpredict inﬂation.21 The underprediction can be
as much as 40 basis points following demand shocks and nearly 1 percentage point
following supply disturbances. Output predictions depend on the source of the shock.
A hump-shaped response of output in the switching environment means the ﬁxed-
regime model initially overpredicts and then underpredicts output. With supply
shocks, the prediction errors are quite large. A constant-coeﬃcient policy rule misses
the initial decline in output by nearly 1 percentage point; the errors change sign after
several periods when constant-coeﬃcient predictions are about .3 percentage points
too pessimistic.
20The reasoning is identical to that contained in footnote 6.
21As in ﬁgure 5, these are expected paths, computed taking draws from regime after the initial
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5. Concluding Remarks
This paper oﬀers a broader perspective on the Taylor principle and the range of
unique equilibria it supports by allowing policy regime to vary over time. Examples
show that endowing conventional models with empirically relevant monetary policy
switching processes can generate important cross-regime spillovers. These spillovers
can alter the qualitative and quantitative predictions of standard models. Along
the way, the paper develops a two-step solution method that obtains determinacy
conditions and solutions for a rational expectations equilibrium. This method can
be extended to a broad class of linear rational expectations models with exogenous
Markov switching in parameters and many discrete regimes.
The paper’s results should be useful for both researchers and policy analysts using
constant-coeﬃcient policy rules in DSGE models. The choice of how to model devia-
tions from such rules is potentially quite important. Under prevailing practice, that
choice is made implicitly. That choice should be explicit, with careful consideration
given to the characteristics of the deviation—how likely is it to recur? how long is it
likely to last? what is the nature of policy behavior during the period of deviation?
Some deviations are more naturally modeled as additive, exogenous errors to the
policy rule. Some might be better modeled as systematic responses to an expanded
information set for the policy authority. Others are best treated as recurring changes
in rules mapping endogenous variables to policy choices, as in this paper.
Modeling policy as we do in this paper requires no more heroic assumptions than
those routinely made in policy research. Largely as a matter of convenience, nearly
all theoretical models assume—rather heroically—that future policy is current pol-
icy. When the current regime is an absorbing state, this assumption is reasonable.
If, as seems more likely, alternative future policies are possible, then rational agents
must have a probability distribution over those policies, and the properties of ob-
served equilibria will depend critically agents’ beliefs about those policies and their
probabilities.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 22
Appendix A. Inflation Model: Determinacy
Let Ω
−s
t = {rt,r t−1,...,s t−1,s t−2,...} denote the agents’ information set at t, not
including the current regime, and let Ωt =Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}. All expectations are formed
conditional on Ωt. We have the equation
α(st)πt = Etπt+1 + ρrt. (20)
Recall that the processes for s and r are independent.
In general, the expectation of inﬂation is given by
E[πt+1(st+1 = i,st = j)|Ωt], (21)
for i,j =1 ,2. Integrating out the current regime, st, and writing (20) for st =1a n d
st =2 ,





















Several remarks about (22) and (23) are in order. First, by using the transition
probabilities as weights on the respective expectations, the current state, st, is no
longer in the conditioning set for the expectations. Second, at any given date t, the
realization of st determines which of the two equations determines the current equilib-
rium.22 Third, the structure of the model—being forward-looking and containing no
lagged endogenous variables—together with the assumption that the Markov process
is ﬁrst-order, imply that πt+1 will not be a function of st, allowing the equations to
be written as





















Introduce the notation that πit = πt(st = i)a n dl e t









22By analogy to the reasoning underlying contingent-claims pricing, these expressions deﬁne in-
ﬂation in the diﬀerent states as diﬀerent “goods.”GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 23









Deﬁne the forecast errors
η1t+1 = π1t+1 − Et[π1t+1]
η2t+1 = π2t+1 − Et[π2t+1].
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The roots of the system are the eigenvalues of
 
p11 1 − p11
1 − p22 p22





and a unique equilibrium requires that both roots exceed 1 in absolute value.
Appendix B. Output and Inflation Model: Solution Method






t−1,...s t−1,s t−2,...} denote
the agents’ information set at t, not including the current regime, and let Ωt =
Ω
−s
t ∪{ st}. All expectations are formed conditional on Ωt. The equations of the
model are
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + u
S
t
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(α(st)πt + γ(st)xt − Etπt+1)+u
D
t
B.1. Conditions for Uniqueness. Following the procedure in appendix A, write
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−1[α(st =2 ) πt(st =2 )+γ(st =2 ) xt(st =2 ) ]
+σ
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As before, deﬁne π1t,π 2t,x 1t,x 2t to represent inﬂation and output when the current
state is 1 or 2. And deﬁne the forecast errors
η
π
1t+1 = π1t+1 − Etπ1t+1,η
π
2t+1 = π2t+1 − Etπ2t+1,
η
x
1t+1 = x1t+1 − Etx1t+1,η
x
2t+1 = x2t+1 − Etx2t+1.
Using these forecast errors to eliminate the conditional expectations in (24)-(27)
yields the system














































































The roots of the system are the generalized eigenvalues of (A,B). A unique equi-
librium requires that all four eigenvalues exceed 1 in absolute value. The eigenvectors
associated with those unstable eigenvalues constitute four linear restrictions that de-
termine the four endogenous forecast errors.
B.2. Solutions. Solutions for the model are derived using the method of undeter-
mined coeﬃcients, just as for the simple model in section 2. Supply and demand
shocks are uncorrelated, so the coeﬃcients on the demand shocks and those on theGENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 25






1 − βp11ρS −βρS (1 − p11) −κ 0
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1 − βp11ρD −βρD (1 − p11) −κ 0
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σ (α1 − ρDp11) −
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Analytic expressions for the coeﬃcients are not easy to interpret, but are straightfor-
ward to compute. These coeﬃcients are the impact elasticities of the various shocks.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 26
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α2 Regime 1 Regime 2
(Active) (Passive)
p11 = .95
.10 5.55 (1.26) 58.20 (17.43)
p11 = .975
.10 1.96 (0.80) 24.07 (13.12)
.05 6.62 (1.30) 136.83 (35.76)
p11 = .99
.10 1.28 (0.62) 17.69 (11.40)
.05 1.73 (0.75) 43.81 (25.15)
.025 3.82 (1.09) 167.30 (63.29)
.02 7.49 (1.33) 383.48 (90.85)
p11 = .995
.10 1.13 (0.57) 16.24 (10.92)
.05 1.30 (0.62) 35.64 (22.86)
.025 1.75 (0.75) 88.46 (50.45)
.02 2.07 (0.82) 125.73 (66.49)
p11 = .999
.10 1.03 (0.53) 15.23 (10.56)
.05 1.05 (0.54) 30.98 (21.31)
.025 1.11 (0.56) 64.14 (43.38)
.02 1.14 (0.57) 81.60 (54.71)
Addendum
p11 = .999
α1 =2 .001 7.23 7413.4
Table 1. Standard Deviation in Active Regime 1 Relative to
Fixed Regime. Active and ﬁxed regimes set α1 = α =1 .5, passive
regime is purely transitory (p22 = 0). Numbers in parentheses are
standard deviations when policy in the active regime is more aggressive,
α1 = 2, relative to the ﬁxed regime with α =1 .5. p11 approximately
equals the ergodic probability of regime 1, active monetary policy.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 30
p11 = .95 p11 = .975
Demand Supply Demand Supply
Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output Inﬂation Output
p22 =0
α2 = .5 1.044 1.008 1.075 .995 1.022 1.004 1.037 .998
α2 = .25 1.060 1.011 1.092 .994 1.030 1.005 1.045 .997
α2 =0 1.073 1.014 1.110 .992 1.037 1.007 1.054 .997
p22 = .5
α2 = .5 1.084 .988 1.143 1.008 1.042 .993 1.071 1.004
α2 = .25 1.120 .983 1.185 1.010 1.059 .990 1.091 1.006
α2 =0 1.165 .977 1.238 1.013 1.080 .987 1.115 1.007
p22 =2 /3
α2 = .5 1.123 .961 1.209 1.025 1.061 .979 1.104 1.014
α2 = .25 1.188 .940 1.290 1.034 1.092 .968 1.142 1.018
α2 =0 1.283 .910 1.408 1.048 1.135 .953 1.194 1.025
p22 = .75
α2 = .5 1.162 .931 1.275 1.044 1.080 .963 1.137 1.024
α2 = .25 1.268 .886 1.412 1.066 1.129 .940 1.199 1.034
α2 =0 1.454 .807 1.653 1.104 1.210 .903 1.302 1.052
Table 2. Standard Deviation in Active Regime 1 Relative to
Fixed Regime. Active and ﬁxed regimes set α1 = α =1 .5a n d
γ1 = γ = .25. Passive regime sets γ2 = .5. Ergodic probability of active
regime ranges from .83 (p11 = .95,p 22 = .75) to .98 (p11 = .975,p 22 =0 ) .GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 31
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Figure 1. Determinacy Frontiers: Model of Inﬂation Deter-
mination. Parameter combinations in the light-shaded regions im-
ply a unique equilibrium in ﬁxed-regime model; combinations in dark-
shaded plus light-shaded regions imply a unique equilibrium in regime-
switching model.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 32
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Figure 2. Variability of Inﬂation: Mildly Passive Most of the
Time. Standard deviation of inﬂation with regime-switching policy
relative to ﬁxed-regime policy (with α =1 .5). Active policy regime,
with α1 =1 .5a n dp11 =0 . Labels in the top panel report the associated
ergodic probability of active policy.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 33
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Figure 3. Determinacy Regions: Model of Output and In-
ﬂation Determination. Parameter combinations in the light-shaded
regions imply a unique equilibriumin ﬁxed-regime model; combinations
in dark-shaded plus light-shaded regions imply a unique equilibrium in
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Figure 4. Determinacy Regions and Private Parameters:
Model of Output and Inﬂation Determination. Parameter com-
binations in the light-shaded regions imply a unique equilibrium in
ﬁxed-regime model; combinations in dark-shaded plus light-shaded re-
gions imply a unique equilibrium in regime-switching model for various
settings of ω and σ.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 35

































Figure 5. Inﬂation Scares and Responses to an Aggregate De-
mand Shock. Solid line is conditional on more-active policy (α2 =2 .5
and p22 = .5); alternative regime has α1 =1 .5a n dp11 = .975. Dashed
line is ﬁxed regime with α = α1. In switching regime, ﬁgures plot the
mean responses from 50,000 draws of regime, beginning in the second
period.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 36





















Figure 6. Determinacy Regions for Taylor and Lubik-
Schorfheide Estimates. Shaded regions give (p11,p 22) combinations
that yield unique equilibrium. Dark region is for Taylor’s (1999a) es-
timates: α1 =1 .5,γ 1 = .75,α 2 = .8,γ 2 = .25; light plus dark region is
for Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2003) estimates: α1 =2 .19,γ 1 = .17,α 2 =
.77,γ 2 = .3.GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE 37






























































Figure 7. Demand and Supply Shocks Under Lubik-
Schorfheide Estimates of Policy Parameters. Solid line is con-
ditional on active regime initially (α1 =2 .19,γ 1 = .17) when other
regime is passive (α2 = .77,γ 2 = .3). Transition probabilities are
p11 = .95,p 22 = .93. Dashed line is ﬁxed regime with α = α1,γ = γ1.
Figures plot the mean responses from 50,000 draws of regime, beginning
in the second period.